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Abstract: Received wisdom suggests that “excessive” wages, defined as the part of real wages that do not 
follow labour productivity developments, are adversely associated with the return on capital. This paper 
argues  that  excessive wages  and  profits are  better thought  as responses  to  changes  in the economic, 
political and institutional environment and there is no a priori reason for a negative relationship between 
them. We thus investigate whether there is a causal effect of excessive wages on capital return using 
aggregate panel data for 19 OECD countries for the period 1970-2000. We account for the endogeneity of 
excessive  wages  by  exploiting  variations  in  institutional  and  labour  market  characteristics.  Our  main 
finding is that excessive wages do not affect the return on capital. This result remains robust to alternative 
empirical  specifications  and  to  alternative  definitions  of  profitability  and  excessive  wages,  and     
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1. Introduction 
      From  Smith,  Ricardo,  and  Marx,  through  to  Keynes,  Kalecki,  and  Schumpeter,  and  to  modern 
endogenous  growth  theorists,  economists  have  agreed  that  the  long-run  performance  of  capitalist 
economies  is  organized  around  the  pursuit  of  profits.  Indicatively,  Keynes  considered  profits  as  the 
“mainspring  of  change”,  whereas  for  the  modern  endogenous  growth  theory,  growth-enhancing 
innovations stem from the profit-seeking efforts of entrepreneurs (see, for instance, Aghion and Howitt, 
1998). This view has been routinely shared by all international economic organizations (see, for instance, 
OECD, 2006), as well as by heterodox economists emphasizing the importance of the profit share in 
inducing jobs-generating capital accumulation (see Glyn, 1997; Rowthorn, 1977, 1999). 
       What determines the return on capital and, in turn, the long-run performance of the economy? A 
variety of academic studies, policy reports and popular views have emphasized the role of labour costs in 
explaining the behaviour of profitability.
1 The mainstream macroeconomic view is that changes in (real) 
wages that are not “warranted” by productivity changes will adversely affect profitability. In this vein, 
following the oil price shocks in the 1970s several studies have pointed out that the failure of real wages to 
adjust to the adverse productivity developments triggered the emergence of a “real wage gap”, defined as 
the  difference  between  the  observed  and  the  estimated  full-employment  real  wage  rate,  that  was 
accompanied  by  a  decline  in  profitability  (e.g.  Sachs,  1979;  Bruno,  1984;  Bruno  and  Sachs,  1985; 
Blanchard, 1997). The opposite picture dominated in the 1990s when real wage changes were lower than 
productivity growth and profitability increased (Baker and Mishel, 1995; Rashed and Samanta, 2005; 
Global Wage Report, 2008). The conventional wisdom on the adverse relationship between profits and 
“excessive” wages, with the latter measured as the part of real wage changes that is not accounted by 
labour productivity changes, is reflected in Figure 1, which plots the 5-year averages of net returns on 
capital and excessive wages for the OECD economies over the period 1970-2000. As can be readily seen, 
there is a clear negative association between the two variables. In contrast, this paper presents detailed 
evidence that there is no causal association between excessive wages and the return on capital.  
                                                 
1 In the remainder of the paper the terms profitability and return on capital will be used interchangeably.   2 
The main idea driving the empirical methodology adopted in this paper is that both wages and the 
return  on  capital  may  be  jointly  determined  by  changes  in  the  economic,  political,  and  institutional 
environment. This issue has been extensively noted in the literature, by both mainstream and heterodox 
economists.  
In particular, developments in mainstream economics, like implicit contract theory and firm-union 
bargaining theories, suggest that the pressure for wage increases will be particularly intense in countries 
(or times) of higher profits (e.g., Christofides and Oswald, 1992; Blanchflower and Oswald, 1994). Hence, 
as long as there is some sharing of the rents generated by the employment relationship, these common 
shocks will affect both business conditions and the wage negotiation process. Rent sharing is at the core of 
the firm-union bargaining models (e.g. Layard et al., 1991).
2 Similarly, changes in both profits and wages 
can be caused by changes in the structural features of the labour market. Card (1996) and Card and 
DiNardo (2002) study how de-unionization and the erosion of the real value of the minimum wage have 
affected the evolution of the wage distribution in the United States. Blau and Kahn (1999) review and 
examine how differences in the degree of centralization of the bargaining process across countries have 
impacted on the shape of the bottom end of the wage distribution. In this vein, several empirical papers 
have examined the impact of profits on wages in endogeneity regressions, mainly using lagged profits as 
instruments.
3 An immediate implication is therefore that the negative relationship between the return on 
capital and excessive wages shown in Figure 1 may reflect an equilibrium response to changes in deeper 
structural and/or institutional characteristics of the economy resulting in spurious correlation. As noticed 
by Mumford and Dowrick (1994), “observed profitability is an endogenous variable, affected directly by 
wage outcomes and perhaps indirectly through efficiency wage effects, so single equation estimates of the 
relationship between wages and financial performance may be subject to simultaneous equation bias [...] 
This result is consistent with the prediction that exogenous shocks to the wage influence the profit term 
and bias the estimating parameter downwards”.   
                                                 
2 The implicit contract literature also implies that there can be a positive co-movement between wages and profits per 
employee as a result of risk-sharing, if both workers and firms are risk averse (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1994). 
3 See Arai (2003), Knight and Li (2005), Du Caju et al. (2009) for extensive reviews.   3 
         For heterodox economists, the relationship between wages and profits is influenced by the national 
corporate governance system, within the institutional and political context of the particular variety of 
capitalism (e.g. Hall and Soskice, 2001). In this respect, it has been argued that a financially driven view 
of corporate governance provides an alternative framework to the theory of marginal productivity. Froud 
et al (2000) have argued that differences in financial markets across countries determine differences in the 
targets of corporate return on capital employed across countries. The data provided by Johal and Leaver 
(2007) contrast the experience of France and Germany with the UK and the USA as far as the required 
return on capital employed is concerned, which is significantly lower in the former group, and illustrate 
the power of institutions that constitute the system of corporate governance in different countries. An 
immediate  implication  is  that  an  “unwarranted”  wage  increase  may  elicit  (or,  more  precisely,  be 
associated with) a different response of the profit rate across countries.   
       Keeping these considerations in mind, in the present paper we address the following question: do 
deviations  of  wages  from  productivity  trends  (excessive  wages)  affect  the  return  on  capital?  In  the 
following  section, and in the Appendix,  we  provide  theoretical examples that  clarify  the  equilibrium 
response of profits and excessive wages to changes in the economic environment. In turn, to investigate 
empirically this unexplored relationship we construct various measures of excessive wages and estimate 
profitability equations using panel data for 19 OECD countries for the period 1970-2000. We show that in 
non-instrumental regressions excessive wages seem to exert a negative and statistically significant effect 
on  capital  return  and  profits.  We  then  account  for  the  potential  endogeneity  of  excessive  wages  by 
exploiting  variations  in  institutional  and  labour  market  characteristics,  like  centralization  of  wage 
bargaining,  minimum  wages,  ratio  of  employees  in  services,  occupational  injuries,  and  labour  force 
demographics. These variables are likely to be correlated with excessive wages, but are not expected to 
affect profits through any direct or indirect channel other than excessive wages. We are able to show that, 
once  excessive  wages  are  instrumented  out,  the  relationship  between  profits  and  excessive  wages 
evaporates.  This  result  is  robust  to  a  number  of  sensitivity  tests,  including  various  definitions  of 
profitability and excessive wages.   4 
Our results offer then some new insights in the endogenous relationship between wages and profits 
that has been extensively studied by several theoretical and empirical investigations cited earlier. In these 
papers, the positive influence of profits on wages may well reflect the fact that the effects of idiosyncratic 
demand shocks or productivity shocks in individual firms are explicitly or implicitly shared between the 
workers and the firm. For example, in efficiency wage models (e.g. Solow, 1979; Shapiro and Stiglitz, 
1984) an exogenous technological improvement will result in both higher profits and real wages increases 
that match the rise in productivity and there will be no excessive wage rate.  In contrast, our paper focuses 
on the causal effects of excessive, rather than simply real, wages on profits in an instrumental framework, 
thus accounting for the role of long-run productivity developments in the endogenous determination of 
labor costs and profits in the macroeconomy. A by-product of our finding on the lack of a causal influence 
of “excessive” wages on profitability is that the usual policy advice given by international economic 
organizations to countries experiencing excessive wages, namely to moderate wage growth in order to 
reflect productivity, and thus enhance the return on capital and long-run economic performance, is not 
always justified. For instance, in accordance with related theoretical literature, our evidence indicates that 
excessive wages may be the result of (privately efficient) rent-sharing mechanisms and thus no wage-
restrictive policy intervention may be required to enhance profitability.
4 
We close the introductory section by emphasizing the need for a macro-econometric study of the 
relationship between excessive wages and profitability. Data permitting, one could also undertake a study 
of the same phenomenon using micro-data. Indeed, some micro-econometric studies have established a 
negative relationship between the variables that are expected to influence excessive wages, like minimum 
wages  or  unionization,  and  profitability  (see  Draca  et  al.,  2008;  Doucouliagos  and  Laroche,  2009). 
However, beyond these partial equilibrium examples it is also important to allow for macroeconomic 
interactions. Assume, for instance, that sectoral profitability declined following a positive excessive wage 
shock. Can we infer that the excessive wage shock would be harmful to economy-wide profitability? Not 
                                                 
4 This conclusion partly echoes Manning’s (1995) demonstration that the presence of involuntary unemployment 
does not guarantee that wage-reducing policies are a cure for unemployment.    5 
necessarily, as profitability of the non-affected firms may have risen due to a switch in demand towards 
their products, driven for example by differential cost and price developments between affected and non-
affected firms or sectors. Alternatively, the rise in wage income may have contributed to the emergence of 
new firms, which depend on mass consumption demand in order to be profitable, or may have relaxed the 
sales constraint for demand-deficient firms, thus providing a Keynesian stimulus to aggregate income and 
profits.
5  Moreover,  as  Murphy  et  al.  (1989)  have  demonstrated,  the  payment  of  a  wage  premium  to 
workers of would-be technologically advanced firms can make profitable the adoption of such superior 
technologies, leading to an economy-wide increase in profits despite the appearance of excessive wage 
increases at the firm level. It is therefore the potential influence of these intersectoral repercussions that 
one hopes to also take into account when examining aggregate profit equations. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some theoretical considerations 
regarding the endogeneity of excessive wages and the return on capital. Section 3 outlines the empirical 
setup  and  describes  the  data.  Section  4  presents  the  empirical  results  and  section  5  discusses  some 
sensitivity tests. Finally, section 6 offers some concluding remarks. 
 
2. Theoretical considerations on excessive wages and profits 
In this section we briefly  review some arguments on the lack of a causal, and negative, relationship 
between excessive wages and the return on capital, and we show that, once we take into account the 
possibility  that  both  wages  and  profitability  are  jointly  determined  in  response  to  changes  in  the 
economic/institutional environment, the co-movement between the two variables is far from unambiguous. 
We focus our discussion on mainstream models since a positive relationship between excessive wages and 
profitability is not a-priori a non-sequitur in heterodox models. 
Why real wage changes may not fully reflect changes in labour productivity? Indeed, a perfectly 
                                                 
5 See, for example, Matsuyama (2002), for the development of an argument along these lines. Malley and Moutos 
(2006) present a model in which developed countries have comparative advantage in the production of high-quality 
varieties.  An  excessive  wage  increase  in this  context  will  increase  (reduce)  demand  for  domestically  produced 
(imported) goods, thus potentially offsetting the decline in profits that excessive wage increases entail.    6 
competitive model with a Cobb-Douglas technology does not allow for a divergence between wages and 
labour productivity, since the marginal product of labour is a fixed proportion of labour productivity with 
the degree of proportionality being equal to the labour share. Hence, wages are equal to the marginal 
product and maintain their proportionality to labour productivity. However, if the economy’s production 
structure is not adequately described by a Cobb-Douglas function, then changes in underlying structural or 
institutional parameters may raise both wages relative to productivity and the return on capital even under 
perfectly competitive conditions (e.g. Rowthorn, 1999).   
Consider, for instance, the response of a firm to changes in how labour effort is affected by wage 
incentives. Assume now a change in the social/institutional environment such that, at a given gap between 
the wage paid by the firm and the alternative wage rate, the elasticity of effort with respect to the premium 
the firm pays over the alternative wage increases.
6 How are we to interpret changes in this elasticity (call it 
θ ), or what are real-world structural/institutional changes which may influence its value? The quality of 
labor relations is an important variable in this respect. We would expect that an intensification of conflict 
in industrial relations would affect the effort that a given value of the relative wage differential would 
procure. A change in the composition of the labour force is another possible factor that may affect the 
value of the elasticity of effort with respect to the “relative wage differential”. For example an increase in 
the proportion of teenagers in the labour force may affect the “economy-wide” value of θ , as teenagers 
may dislike a faster moving production line more than prime-aged workers. Similarly, to the extent that 
sectoral reallocation of economic activity involves changes in the typical working environment (e.g. clerks 
versus construction workers), the “economy-wide” value of θ  will also be affected. In the Appendix we 
present an example of an efficiency-wage model in which we study the effects of changes in the value of 
θ  on excessive wages and the return on capital. The model is based on using a CES production function, 
which does not constrain the marginal product of labour to be a fixed percentage of the average product, 
                                                 
6 The political scientist Ronald Inglehart (1997, 2008) has documented in many industrial countries shifts away from 
the  disciplined,  self-denying,  and  achievement-oriented  norms  of  industrial  society  (which  is  associated  with 
deference to  tradition  and the  attachment  to  organizational  goals) towards  the  fulfilment of  personal  goals  and 
individual self-expression at the cost of neglecting the objectives of broader entities.      7 
thus allowing for the ratio of wages, which are equal to the marginal product, to labour productivity to 
vary in response to changes in both the labour and capital inputs. We show that changes in the elasticity of 
effort induce firms to change their wages and use of factor inputs so that a positive co-movement between 
excessive wages and the return on capital can be generated.
7 
The lack of a causal (and necessarily negative) relationship between excessive wages and the return 
on capital may also be present in an imperfectly competitive framework. In particular, if the labour market 
is not perfectly competitive, wages need not be equal to the marginal product of labour. Figure 2 portrays 
the average and marginal product of labour schedules for a firm that does not pay a wage equal to the 
marginal product.
 Instead, we assume that, for example due to the presence of trade unions, the workers 
are able to appropriate some rents and the wage, 0 w , is between the marginal and average product of 
labour at employment level, N0.
8 Total profits are initially equal to N0(AP0 – W0). The dotted schedule, 
known as the rent division curve (Booth, 1995), which maintains at all employment levels its relative 
vertical distance between the average and marginal product schedules, traces out the resulting wage rate 
under  constant  relative  bargaining  power  between  the  firm  and  the  union.
9  Consider  now  a  new 
equilibrium with wages and employment equal to W1 and N1, respectively. The movement from (w0, N0) to 
(w1, N1) can be triggered in a Nash bargaining framework by shifts of both the contract curve (e.g. due to 
changes in the minimum wage) and/or shifts along the (new) contract curve (e.g. due to a change in 
relative bargaining power). For example, the new (w1, N1) pair may result from the combination of a rise 
in union power, which is expected to shift the wage closer to the average product, and a fall in the 
                                                 
7 The direction of the co-movement (whether both excessive wages and the return on capital fall, or both rise, in 
response to a rise in θ) is influenced by the elasticity of substitution.  
8 Although there is no dispute as to whether some workers are paid above their marginal products, there is some 
dispute about whether some workers are paid below their marginal product (see, for instance, Frank, 1984; Machin et 
al., 1993; Hellerstein et al., 1999). 
9 When the bargaining power is symmetrically distributed between the two parties, the Nash bargaining framework 
implies a bargained wage that is the arithmetic mean between the average and the marginal product of labour (see, 
McDonald  and  Solow, 1991).  In this  case, the rent  division  curve  would be  vertically  equidistant between the 
marginal  and  average  product  schedules  at  all  employment  levels.  If  the  bargaining  power  is  asymmetrically 
distributed, then the wage is a weighted average of the average and the marginal product, with the weights being 
equal to the relative bargaining power of each party; the higher is the (relative) power of the union, the closer will be 
the rent division curve to the average product schedule. We note that the rent division curve traces out the wage-
employment combinations that result from shifts in the position of the contract curve (e.g., due to a change in 
alternative opportunities for workers) for a non-changing bargaining power.   8 
minimum wage, which is expected to increase employment by shifting the origin of a positively-sloped 
contract curve downwards and to the right. If the (percentage) drop in wages is relatively smaller than the 
drop in labour productivity (AP), then we have an excessive wage increase. Yet, as Figure 2 shows, the 
rise in the ratio of wages to productivity can be associated with a rise in profits (and the return on capital, 
since capital is assumed fixed in this example), which are now equal to N1(AP1 – W1). Thus, a negative co-
movement between excessive wages and the return on capital is not certain a-priori. 
 
3. Determining profits and excessive wages 
 
3.1. Empirical setup 
Although several studies have examined the determinants of profitability at the industry level using firm-
level or sectoral-level data, surprisingly the existing empirical literature aiming at estimating aggregate 
profit equations is quite limited and is only indirectly related to the issue of excessive wages.
10 Finkel and 
Tuttle  (1971)  were  the  first  who  attempted to identify  empirically  the  determinants  of  the  aggregate 
corporate profit margin by using capacity utilization, unit labour cost, inflation and exports. The authors 
examined whether a rise in unit labour cost, defined as the ratio of wages per hour over productivity, is 
associated with a fall in the profit margin. Their empirical findings attested to a clear negative association 
between unit labour costs and profit margins. Alesina et al. (2002) examined the effects of various fiscal 
variables on profits, proxied by gross profits per unit of capital in the business sector. They found that all 
revenues and spending variables exert a negative impact on profits with government wages having the 
largest negative effect (mostly through their influence on private sector wage outcomes). 
Our central aim is to analyze how net return on capital for the total economy is affected by wages that 
do not reflect developments in productivity. The estimated equation has the following form: 
                                                 
10 There is, however, a relatively larger literature that has attempted to identify the determinants of profits at the 
sectoral level using measures of the market value or accounting profits (e.g., Schmalensee, 1989; McGahan and 
Porter,  2002).  The  determinants  include  firm-specific  characteristics,  like  market  share,  market  share  growth, 
productivity, firm concentration ratio, replacement value capital stock and growth of the firm, as well as market 
structure  and industry-specific  characteristics, like  barriers  to  entry,  stock  of  advertising,  stock  of  research  and 
development, and efficient-size measures.    9 
 
  nrki,t = β0 + β1 ewi,t + β2 nrki,t-1 + β3 Zi,t + µi + λt + εi,t  (1) 
 
where nrki,t and ewi,t denote profits and excessive wages in country i at period t respectively. In turn, the 
parameter β1 measures the causal impact of excessive wages on capital return. The lagged value of capital 
return on the right hand side is included to capture potentially mean-reverting dynamics triggered by long-
run  economic  cycles  and  also  the  well-known  persistence  in  profits  (see,  for  instance,  Geroski  and 
Jacquemin, 1988; Mueller, 1990; Goddard and Wilson, 1999; McGahan and Porter, 1999; Glen et al., 
2001). The terms µi and λt allow for country dummies and time-specific effects respectively, and εi,t is the 
error term with E(εi,t) = 0 for all i and t. The vector Zi,t is a set of exogenous variables that control for 
profits-related  characteristics  and  includes  the  initial  value  of  the  per  capita  output  growth  rate  as  a 
measure of aggregate domestic demand, the real interest rate as a measure of the cost of capital, the 
average level of schooling of the population as a measure of technology in the economy, and the share of 
government  capital  expenditures  in  total  government  expenditures  as  a  measure  of  the  influence  of 
productive infrastructure on the economy-wide level of productivity. 
Regarding the construction of an indicator for excessive wages, one may well think that this measure 
is provided by the unit labour cost variable calculated by the OECD. However, as argued by Feldstein 
(2008), wages have not risen as rapidly as total compensation because of the rise in fringe benefits and 
other  non-cash  payments.  Thus,  we  need  to  compare  the  productivity  rise  with  the increase  of  total 
compensation rather than with the increase of the narrower measure of just wages and salaries. Following 
Malley and Moutos (2006) we obtain excessive wages by estimating the following regression for each 
country using annual data over the period 1970-2000: 
 
  lnWt = α0 + α1 lnPt + ut   (2) 
 
where Wt is the real total compensation per employee and Pt is the productivity index. The residuals, ut, 
are defined as excessive wages, ewt, that will be utilized in the estimated regressions. 
   10 
3.2. Data 
Based on data availability, we use a panel of 19 OECD countries to estimate equations over the period 
1970-2000.
11 We follow the standard approach of constructing 5-year period averages so as to minimize 
business cycle effects and the well-known procyclicality of profits and wages (see Bottazzi et al., 1996).
12 
The detailed presentation of the dataset can be found in the Data Appendix of the paper. 
Our first concern is to choose an appropriate capital return indicator for our dependent variable. The 
two main sources of profit data are national account and corporate account data. We use here national 
account data since they cover the whole economy and are more consistent across countries and time. 
Generally, the measurement of profits and capital return at the macroeconomic level is subject to a high 
degree of uncertainty. The measurement of the net rate of return on capital is affected by all the difficulties 
related to the calculation of the capital stock. On the other hand, the measurement of profits may contain 
distortions  associated  with  the  difficulties in  measuring  other  economic  variables since  profits  are in 
general calculated as a residual. We attempt to minimize the uncertainty surrounding profitability by 
considering both the return on capital, proxied by the net return on net capital stock nrk, and net profits, 
proxied  by  the  net  (of  depreciation)  operating  surplus,  as  a  share  of  GDP,  npr/y  as  our  dependent 
variables. These measures are obtained by the AMECO database (European Commission, Economic and 
Financial Affairs Indicators) and relate profits either to output or to capital stock since absolute measures 
of profits reflect mainly the size of the economy.
13 
In our basic regressions we measure excessive wages by using real total compensation per employee, 
defined as compensation per employee deflated by GDP deflator, over the OECD productivity index.
14 
Notice that productivity is measured in terms of hours worked, rather than employment, and hence it 
                                                 
11 The countries included are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, 
Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States. 
12 We have experimented with averaging the data over shorter sub-periods (3-year periods), obtaining qualitatively 
similar results with 5-year averaged data. 
13 For an extensive discussion about the advantages and shortcomings of our variables on profits see ECB Monthly 
Bulletin (2004). Note that nrk is not available for Switzerland. 
14 It should be stressed that we avoid constructing a “real wage gap” variable in the spirit of Bruno and Sachs (1985) 
as  this  is  unduly  restricted  to  both  a  perfectly  competitive  interpretation  of  the  data  and  to  a  presumption  of 
knowledge of the “equilibrium” real wage rate (see Bean, 1994, for more details).    11 
captures variations in both the extensive and the intensive margin of labour utilization. Variations along 
the  intensive  margin  (i.e.  hours  of  work)  of  labour  utilization  have  important  consequences  for  the 
movement of both hourly productivity and hourly real wages during the business cycle. For example, 
during a downturn firms (constrained by workers’ reservation utilities) may be willing to increase the 
hourly wage rate in order to contain the reduction in workers’ take-home pay which results from the 
decline in hours of work (Bernanke, 1986). Work intensity also varies during the business cycle; during 
downturns there is an increased excess of total paid-for to actual effective hours worked which impacts 
adversely  on  measured  productivity  (Darby  and  Hart,  2008).  Our  use  of  five-year  averages  should 
minimize the influence of these effects. 
As a final step, we specify the set of control variables, Z, which will be included in equation (1). We 
obtain the growth rate of output per capita, gypc, and government capital expenditure as a ratio of total 
government expenditure, gcap/g, from World Bank, World Development Indicators. The real interest rate, 
rir is obtained from the Baker at al. (2004) dataset that draws from IMF data.
15 Variable educ stands for 
average years of schooling taken from a dataset collected by Barro and Lee (2000) and interpolated by 
Nickell (2006). 
 
4. Empirical results 
In this section we initially present evidence from estimated regressions under the central assumption that 
excessive wages are exogenous to the return on capital. We then address the potential endogeneity of 
excessive wages by conducting panel estimations based on instrumental variable (IV) techniques. 
 
4.1. Baseline results 
Our baseline results from estimating equation (1) are reported in Table 1. We estimate our model using as 
our dependent variable the net rate of return on capital in columns (1)-(3) and net profits to GDP ratio in 
columns (4)-(6).  
                                                 
15 This dataset was created by the IMF and was used for the fourth chapter of April 2003 World Economic Outlook 
‘Unemployment and labour market institutions: Why reforms pay off’.    12 
Specifically, columns (1) and (4) report the results of the OLS estimation of equation (1) when only 
the ‘core’ control variables, namely the demand indicator and the capital cost are included in the profit 
equation. In order avoid the potential endogeneity of per capita income growth we use its initial value, 
which may plausibly be taken as exogenous to the subsequent five years of the capital return and profits. 
As can be readily seen, independently from the profit indicator used, excessive wages, ew, are negative 
and statistically significant providing clear evidence for a negative impact of ew on profits. Also, in all 
cases the control variables have the expected sign. Specifically, output growth per capita, gypc, has a 
positive  effect  on  the  profit  share  while  the  real  interest,  rir,  enters  with  a  positive  but  statistically 
insignificant coefficient. 
In columns (2) and (5) we repeat the same exercise after including the average level of schooling, 
educ and the lagged government capital expenditure ratio, gcap/g, in our estimated specification. The 
coefficient of educ is statistically significant at the 10% level in column (2) indicating that a rise in the 
educational level of the working population has a positive impact on the net rate of return on capital. The 
impact of gcap/g on the net profit-to-GDP ratio is positive and statistically significant while gcap/g does 
not seem to exert a significant impact on the net rate of return on capital. Thus, our results support partly 
the  argument  that  shifting  government  expenditure  towards  its  more  directly  productive  component, 
namely capital expenditure, may have a positive impact on aggregate productivity and profits. 
Finally, in columns (3) and (6) we estimate the dynamic form of equation (1) by performing the 
Arellano and Bond (1991) methodology for dynamic panel data estimation to account for the impact of 
lagged  profits  on  current  profits.  In  all  cases  the  coefficient  on  the  lagged  dependent  variable  is 
statistically  insignificant. The impact of  excessive wages on profits retains its statistical significance, 
whereas the coefficient on gypc is found to be statistically significant at the 10% statistical significance 
level only in the case where the net return on capital is the dependent variable. The coefficient of real 
interest reported in column (3) is negative and statistically significant, indicating that a rise in cost of 
capital will have a negative effect on the net rate of return on capital. The government capital expenditure 
ratio is positive and statistical significant in both cases although its statistical significance level is lower in   13 
column (6). Finally, the coefficient of the average schooling level is positive and statistically significant in 
columns (3) and (6) but at the 10% statistical significance level in the latter case. For these specifications, 
we also report the Arellano-Bond test for serial correlation, the existence of which can cause a bias to both 
the estimated coefficients and standard errors. The p-values of the AR(2) test do not indicate the presence 
of serial correlation. 
To sum up, ignoring the issue of endogeneity, our results indicate that excessive wages, proxied by 
the part of wage growth that cannot be explained by changes in productivity, have a negative impact on 
profits.  This  result  is  robust  to  the  definitions  of  profits,  the  variables  included  in  the  estimated 
specification and the estimation procedure. In the next section we investigate how the assumption of 
exogeneity of excessive wages affects our results. 
 
4.2. Addressing the endogeneity of excessive wages 
The negative impact of excessive wages on capital return, established in the previous subsection, can be 
challenged by the endogeneity of excessive wages. While we do not have an ideal source of exogenous 
variation to estimate any causal effects of excessive wages on capital return, there are some promising 
potential instruments and we experiment with several instrument sets to account for the robustness of the 
results.  The  identification  restriction  is  that  , , , ( , | , , ,) 0 i t i t i t i t Cov instrument ε µ λ = Z ,  where  instrument 
denotes the instrumental variables used in the first-stage regression. Below we present the instrument sets 
along with empirical evidence. 
One main instrument related to excessive wages is the degree of wage bargaining centralization. It is 
well known (see e.g. Layard et al., 1991) that labour markets in the United States and Canada have the 
distinctive feature of overlapping, long-term wage agreements, which are only partially indexed, whereas 
other  economies  have  some  combination  of  short-term  contracts,  high  indexation,  or  centralized 
bargaining. The stylized facts regarding the centralization (or coordination) of wage bargaining are that in 
Anglo-Saxon countries there is no coordination of wage bargaining, whereas in the Nordic countries and 
Austria there is a high degree of explicit coordination, with the rest of the countries falling in between   14 
these extremes (OECD, 1997).
16 In the Nordic countries (e.g. Sweden), the high degree of coordination 
took  the  form  of  gearing  wage  policy  towards  maintaining  the  productivity  of  the  sector  exposed to 
international competition, with economy-wide wage increases tied to productivity growth in the traded 
sector.  To  the  extent  that  productivity  growth  in  the  non-traded  (service)  sector  was  lagging  behind 
compared to the traded sector and that the wage growth differential between the two sectors did not match 
the  differential  productivity  growth,  this  may  well  show  up  as  an  excessive  wage  increase  at  the 
macroeconomic  level.  On  the  other  hand,  Calmfors  and  Drifill  (1988)  have  argued  that  centralized 
bargaining leads to an internalization of the price-level externality present when bargaining takes place at 
the industry level, thus constraining the appearance of excessive wages.
17  
We proxy the level of wage bargaining centralization, cwb, by an index of bargaining coordination 
taken from Ochel (2000) and interpolated by Nickell (2006), which has a range {1,3} and is increasing 
with  the  level  of  coordination.  Table  2  presents  the  results  when  cwb  is  used  as  an  instrument  for 
excessive wages. The lower panel of Table 2 reports first-stage regressions for excessive wages with or 
without  lagged  profits  (the  first-stage  regression  is  common  for  specifications  (1)  to  (2)).  The 
corresponding first-stage regression for excessive wages, ew, in specifications (3) to (4) include cwb, the 
lagged value of profits, the vector Z, and the country dummies and time effects. The coefficient on cwb 
has the expected negative sign and is statistically significant in all first-stage regressions. The upper panel 
of Table 2 reports the results from the second stage where cwb is used as an instrument for ew. The 
coefficient on excessive wages is found to be statistically insignificant in all cases, which implies that 
taking into account the endogeneity of excessive wages eliminates their impact on profits. The rest of the 
variables retain their signs and significance levels. 
Alternatively, we include the level of minimum wage/median wage as an instrument along with wage 
bargaining centralization. In a profit-maximizing framework a rise in the minimum wage raises labour 
                                                 
16 For instance, the IG METALL in Germany provides implicit coordination, whereas in Japan during the “spring 
offensive” the unions communicate their wage targets, which become the focal point of individual wage bargains. 
17  Eichengreen  (1996)  argues  that  centralization  and  coordination  of  sectoral  wage  negotiations  in  post-War  II 
Europe was a key institutional feature of its growth success by moderating wage claims and thus inducing a rise in 
profits and investment.    15 
costs and reduces profits. However, the fall in profits depends on the extent to which other decisions by 
firms, like reductions in non-wage benefits or shifts in the mix of factor inputs away from minimum wage 
labour, offset the rise in the minimum wage (Neumark and Wascher, 2008). Card and Krueger (1995) 
have shown that in efficiency wage models, in which firms choose both the employment and the wage 
rate, a rise in excessive wages brought about by a rise in the minimum wage can leave profits unchanged, 
as cost-saving behaviour may induce a movement towards the production frontier that can offset the 
increased labour costs. Some microeconomic studies have examined either the effect that minimum wages 
or the formation of trade unions may have on profitability (e.g. Draca et al., 2008; Doucouliagos and 
Laroche, 2009).  
In Table 3 we add as an instrument the minimum wage as a percentage of the median wage, minw, 
taken from OECD Labour Market Statistics database. Including minw decreases our sample since the 
variable is available only for ten of our sample countries. Specifically, minw does not exist for Austria, 
Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. Although the coefficient of 
minw is statistically insignificant, including minw increases the significance of cwb. The results from the 
second stage indicate that the coefficient of excessive wages on profits is again statistically insignificant 
when either the net return of capital or the net profits to GDP ratio are used as dependent variables.  
As a next step, we also attempt to capture the relationship between excessive wages and labour force 
characteristics related to unionization and the structure of the labour force by using the share of employees 
in the service sector along with wage bargaining centralization. On the one hand, employees in services 
tend to be less unionized than employees in industry implying that their share in total employment may be 
negatively correlated with excessive wages. On the other hand, this share may also have a positive impact 
on ew according to the standard Balassa-Samuelson effect, since higher productivity growth in the traded 
sector may result in excessive wage growth in the non-traded sector. 
To account for these channels we obtain the share of employees in services in total employees, 
servemp, from OECD Employment by Activities and Status dataset, which is a subset of the Annual 
Labour Force Statistics database. Table 4 presents the results when cwb is included jointly with servemp in   16 
the instrument list and confirms the broad picture derived earlier on. The results show that servemp has a 
negative, but only marginally statistically significant, impact on excessive wages. In fact, the first-stage 
regressions of Table 4 indicate that cwb and servemp do not identify excessive wages as well as cwb and 
minw. In the presence of such weak identification, the bias in the second stage can be substantial even if 
only a weak relationship exists between servemp and the residuals in the capital return equation. Taking 
into account these concerns, the results from the second stage reported at the upper half of Table 4 indicate 
that there is no impact of excessive wages on capital return and profitability. 
Finally,  we  explore  the  endogeneity  of  ew  by  using  another  set  of  instruments,  which  aim  at 
addressing the employment characteristics and involves the age structure of the labour force and the rate 
of occupational injuries. Human capital theory suggests that even for competitive firms the payment for 
labour services need not be matched contemporaneously with their delivery. Becker’s (1964) distinction 
between general training (which increases the employee’s productivity irrespectively of the firm he works 
for) and specific training (which enhances the productivity of employees only within the firm providing it) 
implies that depending on the form of training provided, the workers may not, at any particular period of 
their life, be paid their marginal product. For example, if we examine young workers, it is only those 
receiving specific training that can be expected to earn their current marginal product (as the firm would 
have to pay them their opportunity cost in order to retain them); by the same token, if we look at older 
workers, it is only those that have received general training that can be expected to earn their current 
marginal  product  (Hutchens,  1989).  Similarly,  Lazear’s  (1979)  incentive-compatible  model  of  wage 
growth is predicting an age-earnings profile that is steeper than the evolution of worker productivity. 
Hellerstein et al. (1999) find that older workers (aged 55 and over) are receiving a wage premium that 
exceeds  any  estimated  productivity  differential  (which  is,  in  fact,  sometimes  significantly  negative) 
relative to younger workers. They also find that prime-aged (35-54) workers are equally productive to 
their younger counterparts, but their pay is higher. These results suggest that the age-related composition 
of the workforce may be an important determinant of excessive wages. In turn, occupational injuries 
reflect the safety of the workplace environment, and their lack of occurrence may be thought of as a   17 
compensating  wage  differential.  We  expect  the  rate  of  occupational  injuries  to  be  correlated  with 
excessive wages since workers will be willing to accept a risky job only if they are compensated by higher 
wages. We note that with regard to the excludability of the instruments, while there is no precise theory 
for  why  occupational injuries  should affect  capital return, it  seems  natural to  expect that  changes  in 
occupational injuries over periods of five years should have no other direct effects on the sources of 
business profits measured either in the form of net profits, or as the net return on capital.  
The rate of occupational injuries as a ratio of total labour force, occinj, is obtained by the OECD 
Social Expenditure database and the share of the labour force aged 55-65 in total employment, lfratio, is 
obtained from OECD Labour Force Statistics by Sex and Age dataset which is a subset of the Labour 
Force Statistics database. Table 5 reports regressions where occinj and lfratio are used to instrument out 
ew. The coefficients of occinj and lfratio in the first-stage regression for excessive wages are statistically 
significant in all cases confirming that a rise in occupational injuries and the share of the labour force aged 
55-65 are associated with higher excessive wages and reinforce the view implies that occinj and lfratio are 
valid instruments for ew. Again, the results from the second stage show that the coefficient of excessive 
wages is found to be statistically insignificant in all cases.  
 
5. Sensitivity analysis 
Our general findings indicate that taking into account the endogeneity of excessive wages eliminates their 
impact on profits. In order to test the robustness of our results to alterations in the chosen measures and 
samples, we conduct a battery of sensitivity robustness tests. To save space we report here only the main 
tests and the main results; the detailed results are available upon request. 
We first exclude all observations with estimated errors in the upper and lower 5 percentile of the 
distribution.  Excluding  outliers  results  in  a  statistically  significant  coefficient  of  excessive  wages  on 
profits in columns (2) and (4) of Table 5. All our previous results remain valid. 
As  a  further  robustness  test  we  want  to  check  whether  our  results  depend  on  our  definition  of 
excessive wages. To that purpose we re-estimate our model using alternative definitions of ew in order to   18 
test whether our results depend, firstly, on the fact that we define excessive wages as the product of an 
estimation process and, secondly, on the specific form of the equation from which ew is derived. We use 
as a measure of excessive wages two alternative variables that are not the outcome of an estimation 
process. The first one is the standard unit labour cost measure, calculated as the ratio between labour 
compensation per labour input (per hour or per employee) and labour productivity. Alternatively, we use 
the ratio of real compensation of employee deflated by the private consumption price index to labour 
productivity (both variables are taken from OECD, Economic Outlook database). Estimating all equations 
depicted in Tables 1-5 using any of these measures for excessive wages does not affect our main results. 
We also estimate equation (2) using alternative definitions of Wt (the real total compensation per 
employee) and Pt (the index of productivity). Specifically, we use the labour compensation per unit labour 
input and the labour compensation per employee as alternative measures of Wt and labour productivity per 
unit labour input and labour productivity per employee as alternative measures of Pt (all variables are 
taken from OECD, Economic Outlook database). It can further be argued that productivity will affect 
wages with a lag (e.g. due to the existence of long-term contacts, or delays in recognizing the precise 
magnitude of productivity changes). Therefore, we re-estimate these two new versions of equation (2) as 
well as the initial one by assuming that Wt depends on lagged productivity Pt-1 instead of the current 
productivity level. The residual series of these five new versions of equation (2) can be used as alternative 
estimates of excessive wages. After having re-estimated all equations in Tables 1-5 using these alternative 
definitions of excessive wages we find that our main results remain unaffected. 
Although our estimates of excessive wages are derived on a country-by-country basis using equation 
(2), they might also contain country and time fixed effects. To control for these effects we pool equation 
(2) and we now obtain excessive wages by estimating the following regression for each country 
 
  lnWi,t = γ 0 + γ1 lnPi,t + ψi + ζt + vi,t   (2)’ 
 
where ψi and ζt allow for country dummies and time-specific effects respectively, and vi,t is the error term 
with E(vi,t) = 0 for all i and t. Defining excessive wages, ewi,t as the residuals vi,t from equation (2)’   19 
and re-estimating the equations presented in Tables 1-5 does not affect our main results. 
Finally, Blanchard (1997) has argued that OECD countries can be placed in two groups with respect 
to the behaviour of the labour share. In the first group belong the Anglo-Saxon countries (Canada, UK, 
and  USA),  where  the  labour  share  remained  largely  unchanged  during  the  last  three  decades  of  the 
twentieth  century.  In  the  other  group  of  countries,  consisting  mostly  of  the  continental  European 
economies, there is an inverted U-shaped pattern for the labour share (high in the early 1980s and lower 
towards  the  end  of  the  century).  The  differential  movements  in  the  labour  share  may  be  related  to 
differences  in  collective  bargaining  coverage  and  perceived  union/political  strength  of  the  labour 
movement across countries (see, OECD, 1997). According to some studies (e.g. Caballero and Hammour, 
1998a, 1998b; Nickell et al., 2005), the relatively strong trade unions in the continent managed to resist 
the moderation in wage growth that was warranted by the slowdown in productivity growth, thus inducing 
firms to redirect new investment abroad and/or to the adoption of less labour-intensive technologies. The 
resulting shortfalls in labour demand led to a rise in unemployment, which weakened the outside option of 
labour in the employment relationship and caused a terms-of-trade shift that helped restore equilibrium by 
raising the return on capital back to the level required by international markets. 
To address the potentially differential patterns of wages and profits in these countries we perform the 
analysis presented in Tables 2, 4 and 5 after excluding US, UK and Canada from our sample.
18 The results 
are summarized in Table 6. It should be noted that excluding US, UK and Canada implies that wage 
bargaining centralization together with the share of employees in services in total employment can no 
longer be considered appropriate instruments for excessive wages, as indicated by the corresponding F-
test
19. Yet, as can be readily seen the main picture remains quite robust to the exclusion of the Anglo-
                                                 
18 We refrain from using the minimum wage as a percentage of the median wage, minw, as an additional instrument 
since doing this would reduce our sample to only 7 countries. 
19 Many economists have attributed the “employment gap” between the continental European countries and the 
Anglo-Saxon countries to the superior expansion of service-sector employment in the latter group of countries (e.g., 
European Commission, 2002). The slow expansion of the service sector in the continent, along with the fact that non-
unionized  service-sector  workers  are  covered  through  extension-laws  by  collective  bargaining  agreements  are 
possible explanations for why the moderate changes in service-sector employment are not found to be important 
determinants of excessive wages.    20 
Saxon countries. When wage bargaining centralization is used as an instrument for excessive wages the 
results (shown in the upper part of Table 6) are quite similar to those presented in Table 2. The same holds 
when the rate of occupational injuries as a ratio of total labour force and the share of the labour force aged 
55-65 in total employment are used as instruments for excessive wages. Comparing the results shown in 
the lower part of Table 6 to those of Table 5, the impact of excessive wages on capital return and profits 
disappears in all cases.  
 
6. Conclusions 
This  paper  investigated  the  effect  of  excessive  wages,  defined  as  wages  that  are  not  accounted  by 
developments in labour productivity, on capital return. Although, a cursory look at the data reveals a 
negative  association  between  the  two  variables,  we  find  that  taking  into  account  the  endogeneity  of 
excessive wages with respect to the return on capital and profits shows that there is no causal relationship 
between the two variables. 
Are our results at odds with the standard policy prescriptions, which seem to imply that excessive 
wages are detrimental to profitability? For example, an observation of wages rising faster than labour 
productivity  may  induce  some  policy  makers  to  propose  measures  intended  to  reverse  this  rise  in 
excessive wages, like minimum wages reduction; our results demonstrate that this would be a wrong 
policy action if excessive wages are the result of rent-sharing (private or social) mechanisms. Hence, 
policy prescriptions have to be assessed in the context of more fully articulated causal mechanisms, which 
allow for the underlying driving factors of excessive wages.    21 
APPENDIX 
“Excessive” wages and their co-movement with profits: An example 
 
In the Appendix we present a simple illustration of the possibility that changes in some “deep” 
parameters relating to the labour market can induce positive co-movements of excessive wages and the 
return on capital.  
Consider a perfectly competitive firm run by an entrepreneur, which is the residual claimant of what 
is left (profits) after paying for the use of factor services (capital, K, and labour, L). We assume that the 
firm does not act as if facing a perfectly elastic labour supply schedule, and that it manipulates the wage 
offered  to  its  employees  in  order  to  maximize  its  profits  (or  equivalently,  to  minimize  the  cost  per 
efficiency unit of labour). The production function takes a CES form given by:  
( ) Q eL K
α
ρ ρ ρ     = +   (A.1) 
where Q denotes output, e stands for the efficiency (or effort) of each unit of labour, ρ ≤ 1, determines the 
size of the elasticity of substitution between labour and capital, 1/(1 ) σ ρ ≡ − , and α < 1 implies decreasing 
returns to scale.  
A convenient specification of the effort function assumes that productivity (effort) does not depend 
on the level of the wage offered by the firm, but rather on the relative attractiveness of wages offered 
inside and outside the firm. A particular parameterization of this concept is due to Summers (1988) and 







− =  ,  0 θ >   (A.2) 
where w is the wage paid by the firm and b summarizes the outside-wage opportunities.  
The perfectly competitive firm, in addition to the levels of K (whose rental cost is r) and L, also sets 
the wage rate so as to maximize profits, Π, which are equal to:   22 





ρθ    
   
     
− Π = + − −   (A.3) 
The first-order conditions yield the optimal (“efficiency”) wage chosen by the firm, 







   (A.4) 
As it is standard in efficiency wage models, equation (A.4) implies that the efficiency wage set by the firm 
is a mark-up on the level of the alternative opportunities available to the workers. (If  0 θ = , the firm pays 
the competitive wage rate.) 
Combining (A.2) and (A.4) we get that the optimal level of effort, 











   (A.5) 
We note from equations (A.4) and (A.5) that the optimal wage rate and the resulting optimal level of effort 
depend only on b and θ (which are exogenous from the firm’s point of view). After some manipulations 
we can obtain the optimal levels for labour and capital, 
* L  and 
* K , as: 
1 1 1
1 1 1 1 * w e L
ρ ρ α
ρ ρ ρ α α α
  −     − −       − − − −      ∆ =   (A.6) 
1 1 1
1 1 1 * K r
ρ α
ρ ρ α α α
−     −     − − −     ∆ =   (A.7) 
where, 
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1
b
w e r r
ρ ρθ ρ ρ ρ ρ
ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ θ
θ θ
−  
−  − − − − − −       ∆ ≡ + = +     − −    
. 
The profit-maximizing level of output, 
* Q , can be calculated by substituting equations (A.6), and 
(A.7) into (A.1). Substituting 
* L , 
* K  and 
* Q in the profit equation (A.3), we get that: 
1 1
1 1 * (1 )
α ρ
ρ α α α α
−     −     − −     Π − ∆ =   (A.8)   23 
We are interested in finding how changes in θ  affect both the development of wages (






≡ , and the return on capital. The “excessive wage”,  exc w , is defined as the ratio 
of wages to labour productivity and the return on capital,  K r , is defined as the sum of capital costs plus 
“entrepreneurial” profits, 
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Given these definitions, it is straightforward to show the following Result. 
 
Result A1. A change in the elasticity of effort with respect to the relative wage differential, θ, causes 
excessive wages and the return on capital to move in the same direction. 
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 
   (A.10) 
We note from the definition of ∆, that the effect of changes in θ on ∆ are in the same direction as the 
effects of changes in θ on 
( 1)
1 1 * * 1 1 1 (1 ) w e b
ρ ρ ρ ρ θ θρ
ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ θ θ
    − − −
    − − − − −     = − . Thus, any change in θ will, by inspection 
of equations (A.9) and (A.10), cause changes in the return on capital and in the ratio of wages and 
productivity in the same direction (i.e., both to rise, or both to fall).  
                                                 
20 Our definition of excessive wages is identical to the labour share in this model. However, in actual economies the 
data for the labour share are also shaped by the existence of self-employed individuals and of the public sector.   24 
The above result is independent of the size of the elasticity of substitution between labour and capital. 
Nevertheless, the elasticity of substitution, σ, determines the direction in which both excessive wages and 
the return on capital change in response to changes in θ. Indeed, we find that  
( )








    −
    − −     ∂
= − −
∂ −
  (A.11) 
Equation (A.11) makes clear that if the production function is Cobb-Douglas ( 0 ρ = ), both excessive 
wages (and the return on capital) are not affected by changes in θ. In signing the above expression, in 
addition to ρ, the parameter value that is of particular interest to us is θ, the elasticity of effort with respect 
to the “relative wage differential”. Summers (1988) notes that even very small values of this parameter 
can generate sizeable unemployment rates, and suggests that values close to 0.04 are reasonable values for 
this parameter. Assuming that θ < 0.5, implies that ln(1 ) ln 0 θ θ − − >  and, thus the sign of (A.11) depends 
on the elasticity of substitution. If,  0 ρ > , the elasticity of substitution is larger than unity, and in this case 
both excessive wages and the return on capital will fall in response to a rise in θ.   
   25 
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Data Appendix 
 
A. Profit variables 
 
nrk: Net returns on net capital stock defined as net domestic income minus wage income as a ratio of net 
capital stock (source: AMECO, code: APNDK, APNDK = [UVND - [UWCD × (NETD : NWTD)]] : 
[(OKND × PIGT) : 10.000] where UVND = Net domestic income at current market prices, UWCD = 
Compensation of employees, NETD = Employment, persons, NWTD = Employees, persons, OKND = 
Net capital stock at constant prices, PIGT = Price deflator gross fixed capital formation) 
npr/y: net (of depreciation) operating surplus as a share of GDP, defined as gross operating surplus (GDP 
less compensation of employees less taxes minus subsidies on production, minus consumption of fixed 
capital (source: AMECO, code: UOND, UOND = UOGD – UKCT where UKCT= consumption of fixed 
capital) over GDP. 
 
B. Instruments for excessive wages 
 
cwb: index of bargaining coordination (taken from Ochel (2000) and interpolated by Nickell (2006), code: 
cow (int)). 
minw:  minimum  wage  as  percentage  of  the  median  wage  (source:  OECD  Labour  Market  Statistics 
database, taken from Nickell (2006), code: minw_med). 
servemp: share of employees in services in total employees (source: OECD, Employment by Activities 
and  Status  (ALFS)  dataset,  Annual  Labour  Force  Statistics  (ALFS)  database,  codes:  Employees  in 
Services (ISIC rev.2, 6-9) and Employees in all activities (ISIC rev.2)). 
occinj: total cases of compensated occupational injuries (source: OECD, Social Expenditure database, 
code: Reported injuries, total cases (fatal+non-fatal), ISIC-Rev. 3, as a ratio of total labour force (source: 
OECD, Economic Outlook, code: Labour force). 
lfratio: share of the labour force aged 55-65 in total employment (source: OECD, Labour Force Statistics 
by Sex and Age, Labour Force Statistics (LFS) database, code: share of employment, 55-65). 
 
C. Other variables 
 
W: real total compensation per employee defined as compensation per employee deflated by GDP deflator 
(source: OECD, Economic Outlook, codes: Compensation per Employee, total economy and Deflator for 
GDP at Market Prices). 
P: productivity index (source: OECD, Economic Outlook, code: Productivity Index). 
rir: real interest rate (source: Baker et al. (2004), based on IMF, International Financial Statistics, code: 
rir). 
gypc: per capita output growth rate (source: World Bank, World Development Indicators) 
educ: average years of schooling (source: Barro and Lee (2000), interpolated by Nickell (2006), code: 
educ (int)). 
gcap/g:  defined  as  capital  expenditures  as  a  share  of  total  government  expenditure,  (source:  World 
Development Indicators).   32 
TABLE 1. Profit equation: exogenous excessive wages 
 
  net return on capital  net profits/GDP 
  F.E.  F.E.  A-B  F.E.  F.E.  A-B 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
(nrk)–1  
    0.050       
    (0.51)       
(npr/y)–1 
          -0.077 
          (-0.35) 
ew  -1.888  -2.127  -2.520  -0.321  -0.448  -0.484 
(-4.93)  (-4.63)  (-6.51)  (-3.10)  (-4.02)  (-4.41) 
rir  0.269  -0.135  -1.257  0.198  0.139  -0.056 
(0.50)  (-0.25)  (-2.85)  (1.36)  (1.05)  (-0.58) 
gypc  2.012  1.562  1.087  0.456  0.323  0.172 
(3.01)  (2.57)  (1.79)  (2.99)  (2.42)  (1.54) 
educ    4.334  5.288    0.721  0.720 
  (1.66)  (1.85)    (1.43)  (1.24) 
(gcap/g)–1     0.924  2.192    0.447  0.458 
  (1.08)  (2.36)    (2.57)  (1.79) 
R
2  0.79  0.83    0.44  0.46   
AR(2)      0.15      0.12 
Countries (obs.)  18 (98)  18 (83)  17 (65)  19 (100)  19 (84)  17 (65) 
 
Notes: 
i) F.E. denotes estimation by Fixed Effects OLS and A-B denotes estimation by the Arellano-Bond 
estimation method. A constant is included in all regressions. t-statistics based on robust standard 
errors are shown in parentheses. AR(2) is the test on second-order autocorrelation of the residuals. 
ii) Due to data availability Switzerland is excluded in regressions (1)-(3) and (6) and Portugal is 
excluded in regressions (3) and (6).    33 
TABLE 2. Profit equation: IV estimates 
(Instrument: centralization of wage bargaining) 
 
Dep. variable  nrk  npr/y  nrk  npr/y 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
(nrk)–1       -0.382   
    (-1.30)   
(npr/y)–1        -0.015 
      (-0.07) 
ew  1.427  0.116  2.159  0.125 
(0.73)  (0.30)  (0.87)  (0.29) 
rir  -0.357  0.104  -0.270  0.106 
(-0.54)  (0.70)  (-0.38)  (0.71) 
gypc  1.771  0.356  1.910  0.359 
(2.04)  (2.22)  (1.96)  (2.11) 
educ  0.096  0.048  -2.203  0.026 
(0.02)  (0.05)  (-0.36)  (0.02) 
(gcap/g)–1  -0.231  0.264  -0.142  0.268 
(-0.24)  (1.38)  (-0.14)  (1.50) 
First-stage regression for excessive wages 
cwb  -2.151    -1.918  -1.973 
(-2.61)    (-2.30)  (-2.32) 
(nrk)–1       0.056   
    (1.67)   
(npr/y)–1        0.136 
      (0.86) 
rir  0.008    -0.006  -0.016 
(0.05)    (-0.04)  (-0.10) 
gypc  0.099    0.068  0.065 
(0.57)    (0.39)  (0.36) 
educ  1.742    1.893  1.800 
(1.76)    (1.83)  (1.71) 
(gcap/g)–1   0.317    0.270  0.245 
(1.98)    (1.64)  (1.52) 
First-stage R
2  0.53    0.55  0.53 
F-test (p-value)  0.010    0.024  0.022 
Countries (obs.)  19 (84)    18 (83)  19 (84) 
 
Notes:  
i)  A  constant  is  included  in  all  regressions.  t-statistics  based  on  robust  standard 
errors are shown in parentheses.  
ii) Due to data availability Switzerland is excluded in regression (3).  
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TABLE 3. Profit equation: IV estimates 
(Instruments: centralization of wage bargaining, minimum wages)  
 
Dep. variable  nrk  npr/y  nrk  npr/y 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
(nrk)–1       -0.322   
    (-1.47)   
(npr/y)–1        0.201 
      (1.37) 
ew  0.785  0.163  1.891  -0.034 
(0.51)  (0.60)  (1.08)  (-0.12) 
rir  -0.260  0.067  -0.323  0.086 
(-0.30)  (0.55)  (-0.37)  (0.97) 
gypc  1.045  0.271  1.419  0.223 
(0.95)  (1.26)  (1.15)  (1.09) 
educ  -0.952  -0.872  0.382  -0.929 
(-0.12)  (-0.50)  (0.04)  (0.71) 
(gcap/g)–1  0.251  0.461  -0.049  0.437 
(0.27)  (2.95)  (-0.05)  (3.04) 
First-stage regression for excessive wages 
cwb  -3.342    -3.273  -3.303 
(-3.29)    (-3.06)  (-3.21) 
minw   -0.170    -0.158  -0.161 
(-1.52)    (-1.36)  (-0.91) 
(nrk)–1       0.009   
    (0.25)   
(npr/y)–1        0.021 
      (0.07) 
rir  -0.171    -0.162  -0.164 
(-0.10)    (-0.56)  (-0.57) 
gypc  0.031    0.026  0.031 
(0.10)    (0.08)  (0.09) 
educ  0.248    0.179  0.216 
(0.07)    (0.05)  (0.06) 
(gcap/g)–1   0.409    0.407  0.400 
(2.14)    (2.09)  (1.89) 
J-statistic  0.60  0.64  0.96  0.82 
First-stage R
2   0.70    0.70  0.70 
F-test (p-value)  0.004    0.009  0.013 
Countries (obs.)  10 (40)    10 (40)  10 (40) 
 
Notes: See Table 2. Due to data availability Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland are excluded in all regressions   35 
TABLE 4. Profit equation: IV estimates 
(Instruments: centralization of wage bargaining, ratio of employees in services) 
 
Dep. variable  nrk  npr/y  nrk  npr/y 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
(nrk)–1       -0.270   
    (-1.38)   
(npr/y)–1        0.149 
      (0.73) 
ew  0.453  -0.321  1.040  -0.412 
(0.37)  (-1.49)  (0.69)  (-1.55) 
rir  -0.231  0.158  -0.143  0.136 
(-0.36)  (1.07)  (-0.21)  (1.03) 
gypc  1.444  0.325  1.593  0.297 
(1.84)  (1.45)  (1.83)  (2.19) 
educ  -1.603  0.190  -3.201  0.368 
(-0.46)  (0.35)  (-0.71)  (0.64) 
(gcap/g)–1  0.634  0.544  0.610  0.505 
(0.65)  (2.86)  (0.60)  (2.87) 
First-stage regression for excessive wages 
cwb  -2.079    -1.945  -1.892 
(-2.15)    (-2.02)  (-1.88) 
servemp  -0.446    -0.397  -0.419 
(-1.93)    (-1.69)  (-1.77) 
(nrk)–1       0.042   
    (1.18)   
(npr/y)–1        0.141 
      (0.77) 
rir  0.212    0.173  0.180 
(0.83)    (0.67)  (0.67) 
gypc  0.110    0.080  0.073 
(0.55)    (0.40)  (0.35) 
educ  1.626    1.745  1.646 
(1.57)    (1.57)  (1.51) 
(gcap/g)–1   0.400    0.365  0.330 
(2.11)    (1.83)  (1.60) 
J-statistic  0.15  0.03  0.18  0.03 
rst-stage R
2   0.54    0.55  0.54 
F-test (p-value)  0.008    0.023  0.029 
Countries (obs.)  18 (74)    18 (74)  18 (74) 
 
Notes: See Table 2. Due to data availability Switzerland is excluded in all regressions.   36 
TABLE 5. Profit equation: IV estimates 
(Instruments: occupational injuries, labour force 55-65 ratio)  
 
Dep. variable  nrk  npr/y  nrk  npr/y 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
(nrk)–1       -0.36   
    (-0.84)   
(npr/y)–1        -0.04 
      (-0.16) 
ew  -0.50  -0.05  -0.25  -0.04 
(-0.44)  (-0.22)  (-0.19)  (-0.19) 
rir  0.09  0.16  0.15  0.17 
(0.06)  (0.51)  (0.09)  (0.55) 
gypc  2.91  0.43  3.25  0.44 
(2.84)  (2.43)  (2.84)  (2.31) 
educ  5.02  0.32  3.57  0.23 
(0.59)  (0.20)  (0.46)  (0.16) 
(gcap/g)–1  1.00  0.11  1.10  0.12 
(0.71)  (0.45)  (0.46)  (0.48) 
First-stage regression for excessive wages 
occinj  1.783    1.498  1.845 
(2.63)    (2.14)  (2.27) 
lfratio  1.439    1.597  1.406 
(2.10)    (2.34)  (2.07) 
(nrk)–1       0.098   
    (0.14)   
(npr/y)–1        -0.055 
      (-0.17) 
rir  0.095    0.017  0.127 
(0.20)    (0.04)  (0.24) 
gypc  -0.165    -0.243  -0.152 
(-0.61)    (-0.94)  (-0.52) 
educ  1.263    1.544  1.143 
(0.59)    (0.76)  (0.48) 
(gcap/g)–1   -0.156    -0.173  -0.147 
(-0.54)    (-0.65)  (-0.49) 
J-statistic  0.73  0.75  0.96  0.75 
First-stage R
2   0.62    0.65  0.62 
F-test (p-value)  0.008    0.028  0.014 
Countries (obs.)  16 (45)    15 (44)  16 (45) 
 
Note:  See  Table  2.  Due  to  data  availability  Austria,  Netherlands  and  US  are 
excluded in all regressions and Switzerland is excluded in regression (3).   37 
TABLE 6. Profit equations for non-Anglosaxon countries: IV estimates 
 
Dep. variable  nrk  npr/y  nrk  npr/y 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Instruments: cwb  
ew  1.862  0.061  2.489  0.073 
(0.85)  (0.15)  (0.95)  (0.16) 
cwb  -2.186    -1.997  -2.0184 
(-2.41)    (-2.24)  (-2.18) 
First-stage R
2   0.60    0.62  0.60 
F-test (p-value)  0.019    0.030  0.033 
Countries (obs.)  16 (69)    15 (68)  16 (69) 
Instruments: cwb, servemp 
ew  2.275  -0.108  2.626  -0.169 
(1.08)  (-0.34)  (1.10)  (-0.50) 
cwb  -2.141    -2.050  -1.970 
(2.02)    (-1.99)  (-1.78) 
servemp  -0.329    -0.304  -0.322 
(-1.07)    (-1.04)  (-1.07) 
J-statistic  0.69  0.17  0.71  0.18 
First-stage R
2   0.61    0.63  0.62 
F-test (p-value)  0.084    0.101  0.137 
Countries (obs.)  15 (60)    15 (60)  15 (60) 
Instruments: occinj, lfratio 
ew  -1.173  -0.139  -0.935  -0.130 
(-1.09)  (-0.58)  (-0.80)  (-0.55) 
occinj  2.048    1.748  2.045 
(2.54)    (2.20)  (2.23) 
lfratio  1.401    1.564  1.404 
(2.05)    (2.22)  (2.03) 
J-statistic  0.69  0.74  0.91  0.74 
First-stage R
2   0.62    0.67  0.62 
F-test (p-value)  0.014    0.041  0.020 
Countries (obs.)  14 (39)    13 (38)  14 (39) 
 
Note: See Table 2. Due to data availability the countries included are those of Tables 
2, 4 and 5 with the exception of US, UK and Canada. 
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Source: AMECO and authors’ calculations (see the text for the exact definition of the variables). 
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